Decisionmaking Process

Principle 8:

Limitations Imposed by the Decision-Making Process

Foreign policy is usually developed through some group decision-making process. Public administration and organizational development specialists identify several significant problems inherent in any group decision-making process.

It is generally assumed the best policy is a policy arrived at through "synergy" and consensus. Synergy is the additional energy and wisdom generated when a group of people work together to develop policy or accomplish a task. The shared wisdom and energy of the group is superior to the wisdom and energy of the individual members of the group if each was acting solely on his or her own. Consensus is a decision which every member of the group supports. Synergistic decisions often have consensus support simply because of the group processes used to develop the decision. However, if the synergistic consensus is achieved through either "Groupthink," the "Abilene Paradox," "Incrementalism," "Oppositional Mentality," or "Crisis Breakdown," that consensus may be the wrong choice.

"Groupthink" is agreement based, not on the merits of the policy options, but on the shared myths, perceptions, mind-sets, and experiences of the decision-makers. The consensus reflects the fact the decision-makers all think alike, not that they thoroughly consider the merits of the alternative policies. Some analysts claim President John Kennedy's actions in the Cuban missile crisis and the Bay of Pigs invasion crisis are based on "groupthink" within his administration rather than on thoughtful, deliberate consideration of all the alternatives. The members of the Kennedy administration tend to share similar Ivy League educational backgrounds, similar privileged life-styles, and similar life experiences. This shared limited vision may limit the foreign policy options they consider.

"Groupthink" develops out of basic group dynamics theory. In all groups, members tend to evolve informal objectives to preserve friendly intragroup relations and these objectives become part of the hidden agenda of the group. According to Irving L. Janis, one of the fathers of "groupthink" theory,

"I use the term "groupthink" as a quick and easy way to refer to a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action. ... Groupthink refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing and moral judgment that results from in-group pressures." (Janis, 9)

Specific symptoms of "groupthink" include (1) in-group cohesiveness, (2) the illusion of in-group morality and superiority, (3) stereotyped views of opponents as weak, stupid, immoral or inferior, (4) insulation from outside judgments and critiques, (5) illusion of in-group invulnerability, (6) illusion of in-group unanimity of opinion, (7) suppression of self-doubt and group doubt, (8) suppression of deviational points of view from inside or outside the group, (9) group member docility in the face of leadership, and (10) willing self-censorship and self-denial. Groupthink theorists believe these symptoms may contribute to many foreign policy fiascoes, including Pearl Harbor, Korea, the Bay of Pigs, and Vietnam. Janis sees the Bay of Pigs as one of the "worst fiascoes ever perpetuated by a responsible government" and "a perfect failure."

"The failure of Kennedy's inner circle to detect any of the false assumptions behind the Bay of Pigs invasion plan can be at least partially accounted for by the group's tendency to seek concurrence at the expense of seeking information, critical appraisal, and debate. The concurrence-seeking tendency was manifested by shared illusions and other symptoms, which helped the members to maintain a sense of group solidarity. Most crucial were the symptoms that contributed to complacent overconfidence in the face of vague uncertainties and explicit warnings that should have alerted the members to the risks of the clandestine military operation-- an operation so ill conceived that among literate people all over the world the name of the invasion site has become the very symbol of perfect failure." (Janis, 48-49.)

"Abilene Paradox" is also associated with consensus building. Members of groups tend to make accommodations to one another in an effort to "get along" and maintain group solidarity. As members defer to one another and refrain from appearing confrontational or oppositional, important foreign policy options are not presented for consideration and a false consensus develops. The parable of the "Abilene Paradox" sees a family vacationing in Abilene although no member of the family actually wants to visit Abilene; they all failed to express their true feelings during the decision-making process for the sake of family unity. Perhaps this is also the way foreign policy is developed in some unity-oriented administrations. The first idea expressed receives consensus approval because no one wants to appear divisive. The "Abilene paradox" leads to decisions that are merely acceptable to all rather than to the best decision if everyone is willing to honestly express themselves. During the Vietnam War, for example, many members of President Lyndon Johnson's civilian administration and many top-ranking military officers are reluctant to irritate President Johnson by giving him a true assessment of either the unstable political conditions within South Vietnam or the impotence of the American and South Vietnam military to effectively counter the military actions of the South Vietnamese communist rebels or the North Vietnamese military. As a result, President Johnson has limited information upon which to make choices and a false notion of the degree to which his choices are supported by the South Vietnamese people and the American military.

"Incrementalism" results when group members seek to avoid appearing extreme and make decisions that vary only slightly from the status quo. Moderate changes, only one step from the status quo, are proposed and accepted, even if more radical change might be more appropriate and more desired by each individual member of the group. The incremental introduction of troops into Vietnam during the John Kennedy administration and the incremental deployment of small units of troops throught the globe during the Bill Clinton administration, gradually stretching to the limits America's military capabilities, are both examples of incrementalism that leads to trouble.

"Oppositional mentality" develops when some members of the group believe themselves to be outcasts within the group. This minority becomes hostile, oppositional, and obstructive and, accordingly, limits the policy choices available to the group. To justify their obstruction and obstinance, the oppositional group engages in myth-building to cloak their behavior in self-righteous, moral fervor and to cast public suspicion on the morality and virtue of that majority which the opposition opposes. The long-term affect of this myth-building is the creation of false public perceptions and inappropriate limits on the future foreign policy options available to the group. The actions of Senator Joseph McCarthy and the foreign policy "Red Scare" he unleashed would be an example.

"Crisis Breakdown" refers to the irrational behavior that may result from decision-making under extreme stress. Decision-making theorists are especially concerned about nuclear deployment decisions in the "Cold War" environment of deterrence and mutual-assured destruction. In a crisis of monumental importance, the possibility increases of "psychological stress that (leads) to a misreading of signals." (Allison, 19). In stressful crisis situations, perceptions change and decisions are altered and less predictable. Film dramatizations love to focus on breakdown decision-making; one of the best is The Bedford Incident depicting the effect of stress on a NATO naval crew and the disasterous foreign policy outcome as the effects of that stress lead to the accidental firing on a Soviet submarine.

"What starts out as rational is likely to become less so over time. And accidents that would not matter much in normal times or early in a crisis might create 'crazy' situations in which choice is so constrained that 'rational' decisions about the least bad alternatives lead to outcomes that would appear insane under normal circumstances." (Allison, 214)

Other organization decision-making limitations include failures to communicate accurately and effectively, failure to conduct appropriate and thorough research, lack of time to act or react, lack of information or the means to share information, problems with secrecy or jealousy, and problems with accurate definition of terms. All these problems are featured in the flawed decision-making by President Lyndon Johnson during the Vietnam War. He simply lacks accurate, timely, honest information upon which to base his foreign policy and military decisions.

Finally, current choices limit future choices. Once a branch of the decision-making tree is selected, it is nearly impossible to jump to another branch of the tree. Current decisions have future consequences and sometimes leaders can do little more than allow decisions to play themselves out to their logical or inevitable conclusion. For example, once the Czar of Russia decides to mobilize his troops in anticipation of an eventual German mobilization, the German need to launch a first-strike against Russia's allies becomes inevitable and the dominoes leading quickly to World War I begin to fall.

Principle 8:

Limitations Imposed by the Decision-Making Process

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